Introduction
Most people regard knowledge as a key source of competitive advantage and, therefore, of corporate performance. As a consequence, a large literature has grown up over the past decade around the subject of corporate learning. Much of it is concerned with how learning occurs, how knowledge is retained within the firm and how learning affects the strategy and structure of a firm's operations. This literature carries a strong normative presumption that learning is a good thing for a firm to do. The problem is that the evidence that we have on the link between learning and corporate performance is sketchy. This is, of course, no surprise, as neither learning nor the stock of knowledge that it presumably creates is directly observable. Much of what we do know about the effect of learning on corporate performance comes from work that uses expenditures on R&D or patenting as proxies for knowledge accumulation. While this is better than nothing, these are, at best, very limited measures of the totality of learning which firms might benefit from. Nevertheless, to the extent that these proxies measure learning, this literature suggests that learning does indeed stimulate corporate growth, profitability and productivity. This paper takes a somewhat different approach to the problem of identifying the link between learning and corporate performance. Rather than using one or more imperfect proxies for corporate learning to explain performance, we start from the premise that both the process of learning, and the stock of knowledge that it creates, are wholly unobservable. What is observable, however, are the consequences of learning. What is more -and this is the key to our approach -different types of learning (or, different learning mechanisms) have different implications for the times series behaviour of the observable consequences of learning, namely corporate performance (and, in particular, corporate growth). Further, these differences do not rely on having access to more than two observable variables for each firm. It follows, then, that one ought to be able to infer something about the nature of the learning which a firm does from observations about it's performance.
We follow the lead of the R&D literature and posit a relationship between the stock of knowledge possessed by a firm and it's output. We then distinguish five different types of learning, and show that each produces a distinctive time path for output. After reviewing some recent literature on firm learning in Section 1, we will outline these models in Section 2 Although these different models of learning are not nested, it turns out that they all reduce to a common, baseline specification which emerges from a model in which learning is wholly unsystematic and opportunistic, and we will take this to be our null hypothesis. In Section 3, we apply these four models to firm level data drawn from 85 years of the US automobile industry. We conclude in Section 4 with a few observations on future directions for research of this type.
Learning and Corporate Performance
The simplest and most familiar story about learning is that which has been built up around 'learning by doing' and the learning curve. In this story, firms accumulate experience through production and generate a stock of knowledge which is proportional to their cumulative output. If corporate performance is driven by this stock of knowledge then performance differences between firms should be fairly stable over time (since differences in cumulative output will not change much once firms are very well established). It is usually argued that because learning is essentially an investment in a very specific product and associated production process, firms should pursue learning curve strategies only when consumer tastes or the technological environment is relatively stable. When it's market is turbulent, firms are more likely to gain competitive advantage by pursuing strategies that focus on exploring and creating new product variants (instead of investing even more existing ones). Amongst other things, this suggests that firms pursuing learning curve strategies are likely to lose market share in periods of turbulence, but will outperform others when their market environment is stable and their customers are price sensitive.
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The business literature on core-competencies and the evolutionary literature on innovation has pushed the idea of corporate learning well beyond the notion that learning occurs as a simple 'byproduct' of doing. 2 The evolutionary view focuses on the variety of different ways that firms can learn and how this learning is tied to different sources of knowledge and technological capabilities, both of which may be embedded in organisational structures. In this way of thinking, learning evolves over time through the development of specific capabilities and costly investments in 'absorptive capacity'.
3 Whatever their source, these capabilities are widely regarded as being difficult to imitate, and certainly this is true for a competence like 'absorptive capacity'. It is no surprise to discover, therefore, that this view of learning has developed, in part, to explain persistent inter-firm differences in accounting profitability that have been widely observed. The fact that a firm's absorptive capacity is likely to depend on its prior knowledge means that in this view learning is path-dependent: those firms that have developed a significant body of knowledge will be better learners and hence develop more knowledge in the future. This is not dissimilar to the learning by doing story, except that experiential learning is typically narrower than learning through investments in R&D (etc). The diversity of a firm's knowledge gained though production and research is important since it increases the chances that the new information which arrives possibly by happenstance can be understood and interpreted creatively. Hence, 'absorptive capacity' is a result, or by-product, of the firm's active engagement in learning activities: it is both a cause and a consequence of learning.
A number of studies have linked different types of learning to different organisational and industry environments, arguing that learning in different environments results in different technological trajectories which then affect future learning patterns:
A first broad property is the diversity of learning modes and sources of knowledge across technologies and across sectors. For example, in some activities knowledge is accumulated primarily via informal mechanisms of learning by doing and learning by interacting with customers, suppliers, etc. In others, it involves much more formalised activities of search (such as those undertaken in R&D labs). In some fields, knowledge is mostly generated internally and specific to particular applications. In others it draws more directly upon academic research and scientific advances. Recent research suggests that this diversity of learning modes may be a major determinant of the diverse patterns of evolution in industrial structures (e.g. in terms of distribution of firm sizes, natality and mortality of firms, corporate diversification).
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Observations like this often yield a classification of different types of learning, including: learning by doing, learning by using, learning from advances in science and technology, learning from interindustry spillovers, learning by interacting, and learning by searching (this particular list is taken from Malerba, 1992) . Depending on which sector that we are examining., some of these are internal to firm's production process or use of products, while others are external to the firm and are related to the development of science or the actions of its competitors. Needless to say, some of these sources of learning generate knowledge that is easy to protect, and to the extent that this is true, they are likely to lead to long term performance differences between firms.
Rich and insightful as this literature undoubtedly is, it provides only very modest guidance for empirical work. The two strongest implications of this literature are that: learning is likely to be firm and/or sector specific, and that it is likely to lead to persistent differences in corporate performance. This, unfortunately, does not take us very far. In particular, persistent differences in performance are not necessarily permanent, and that means that it is important to learn as much about how much firms forget as about how (and how much) they learn; understanding competence destruction is as important as competence enhancement if we are to understand the performance of particular firms over time.
5 Further, it is one thing to argue that there are important firm differences in learning or in the stock of competencies maintained by different firms in different sectors, and quite another to associate these differences with observable differences in corporate performance. It is, therefore, important to move beyond the 'how' and 'why' of corporate learning, and address the question of 'so what?'. That is our goal in this paper.
Observable Implications of Different Learning Processes
We start with the presumption that learning, and the stock of knowledge which results from it, are wholly unobservable. What can be observed, however, is the consequences of learning, and we focus here on output. We posit the existence of a 'knowledge production function' which links the stock of knowledge possessed by firm i at time t, KN(t), with it's output, Q(t):
where A(t) summarizes the effects of all other inputs (and anything else) on output rates. Taking logs and first differencing,
Since the rate of growth of KN(t) is, by definition, the rate of learning, it follows immediately that the rate of growth of the firm will vary directly with the rate of learning. For future reference, we use LE(t) to denote the rate of growth of KN; i.e. LE(t) ≡ ∆log KN(t). Further, for expositional ease, we will suppose that ∆log A(t) ≡ ε(t), a white noise error process.
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Equations (1) and (2) suggests that corporate performance measured by the current rate of growth of the firm is a signal of the current rate of learning. The quality of that signal evidently depends on two things: α, the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge, and the inherent variability in A(t). One simple observation that one can make from this is that the performance of firms in high technology sectors where learning really matters and which are insulated from macroeconomic and other shocks will be more informative about their learning than might be the case in more traditional, cyclically sensitive sectors. A more substantive observation, though, is that cross firm comparisons of learning using this approach are likely to be most informative for a sample of firms with a similar α and a similar variance in A(t); i.e. for firms in the same sector. A third observation is that any inferences about learning that one makes using (1) or (2) are, of course, conditional on how allowance is made for other factors, A(t).
The production function approach apparently underlying equation (1) appears at first sight to be rather restrictive, or at least mechanistic, and it is important to note that the basic relationship revealed in (1) emerges from almost all output choice models typically used in the theory of the firm literature. A firm that maximizes profits will choose an output rate which depends on it's marginal costs and some parameters of demand, and, since these parameters are affected by learning, it follows that there will be a relationship between the stock of knowledge and output rates. 7 Even if this relationship is very complex (which it is not in most of the commonly used models), (1) can be regarded as a first order approximation to the true relationship between output and those cost or demand parameters affected by learning. It is, therefore, unlikely to paint an terribly inaccurate picture of how learning affects corporate performance (except, perhaps, in being overly simple).
The real problem with (1) or (2) is that neither KN(t) nor the rate of learning, LE(t), are directly observable. However, different types of learning will induce different time paths in KN(t), and so in Q(t). It follows, then, that observing movements in Q(t) over time may cast useful light on the time path of KN(t) and so on the rate of learning. We distinguish five different types of learning process:
The simplest story of all about learning is that which says that firms learn things in a wholly unstructured, unsystematic sort of way, opportunistically absorbing whatever their environment (randomly) throws up and, just as likely, forgetting what they have learned previously. In this case,
where ξ(t) is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and a variance which is constant (or at least so long as the environment which generates the learning opportunities to which the firm passively responds is constant over time). In this case, it follows that
meaning that firm size follows a random walk. This is, of course, exactly the state of affairs described by Gibrat's Law, and we take it as our null hypothesis in what follows.
(ii) Learning by Innovation
The basic idea of a learning by innovation story is that virtually all learning can be tied to the appearance of particular product or process innovations. 8 One can think of this in one of two ways: either these innovations embody all the learning that firms actually do, or they act as a signal that intensive (but unobserved) learning has occurred and, amongst other things, that it has produced has produced the particular innovation in question. Either way, the presumption is that relatively little learning occurs between innovations, so that observing the realization of an innovation is tantamount to observing the act of learning. If I(t) is a count of major product or process innovations which are introduced by firm i at time t, then this story might be modelled as
where β > 0. It follows, then, that
meaning that output follows a random walk with a trend driven by the stochastic arrival of particular innovations.
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There are many ways that one can make the specification in (5) richer and possibly more realistic. If major innovations have long lasting effects on performance, or if their short run effect is much smaller than their long run effect, then (6) might be generalized to
where β(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L. Similarly, one might generalize (6) by allowing the effects of particular innovations to be firm specific, or to depend on the number of previous innovations that the firm has produced (allowing for some kind of differential ability to use new innovations).
(iii) Spillovers
It is, of course, very likely that firms will learn from their rivals, so that learning occurs largely as a result of imitation between firms. There is a well established tradition of modelling spillovers in the patents and R&D literature, and it is one of two routes that we propose to follow here. 10 To avoid notational clutter, we continue to suppress the i subscript which identifies firm i, but we will use a j subscript to identify variables associated with any or all of i's rivals. If the effects of innovative activity spillover between firms, then (6) becomes
where βj measures the effect that rivals innovations, Ij(t), have on the performance of firm i.
There are several problems with (8) as a way of capturing spillovers, but the most serious is that it presumes that all spillovers are associated with observable innovations. It is more than possible that some or all of the entire stock of knowledge, KNj(t), possessed by firm j might spillover to I in a manner unrelated to the arrival of any particular innovation. If we suppose that this occurs with at least a one period lag, then (1) becomes
which yields a relationship between the growth rate of firm i in period t and that of it's rivals in t-1,
where λ ≡ ααj. Equation (10) shows clearly that a high degree of inter-firm spillovers is likely to lead to a convergence in growth rates and, possibly in the long run, firm size.
(iv) Learning by Doing
As we noted earlier, the classic source of learning is experiential, and it underlies the famous 'learning curve' much beloved of corporate strategists. Although there are many ways to think about 'experience', most accounts focus on cumulative production, X(t) ≡ Σt Q(τ), as the main driver of experience and, therefore, of learning,
In passing, it is worth noting that this specification can be enriched in at least two ways (which we will not pursue here). In the first place, learning may spillover between firms, and so the performance of firm i may depend not only on it's own cumulative output, but also more generally on the experience of some or all of it's rivals (this may be particularly the case if some or all of the industry is geographically concentrated). This will create a link between the growth rates of individual firms and cumulative industry output. Second, one might allow knowledge to be forgotten or to become obsolescent. One very simple way to do this is to define the stock of experience as X(t) ≡ Q(t) + Στ ρτQ(τ), where 0 < ρ < 1 is a depreciation factor which describes the rate at which experience is forgotten. This effectively turns (12) into
where the middle term on the right hand side of (13) is effectively a weighted average of the rate of growth of firm i in previous years.
(v) Learning using Internal Resources
None of the learning mechanisms thus refer to any limit or constraint on the ability of firms to learn. In fact, most scholars believe that there are constraints on the ability of a firm to learn, and that these depend on a set of capabilities usually referred to as 'absorptive capacity'. In addition, there may also be constraints on the speed with which firms accumulate knowledge (analogous to Penrose effects). Both of these observations effectively mean that the rate of growth of the stock of knowledge of the firm is likely to depend on its level and perhaps also on the recent increase in that stock. Further, it is generally believed that there may be increasing returns to knowledge; i.e. that knowledge gained today facilitates the acquisition of further knowledge tomorrow. This too will create a link between the stock of knowledge maintained by a firm today and tomorrow. Either way, it seems reasonable to believe that learning might depend on
which means that
where
Equation (14) is a specification which is familiar from a large empirical literature on the growth of firms. 12 The most common version of (14) used in that literature sets ϕ = 0 and generates estimates of ρ, interpreting it as a measure of the degree of 'reversion to the mean' (or, in more modern parlance, 'convergence'). Equation (14) gives one way of thinking about how reversion to the mean occurs. The parameter δ reflects the effects of absorptive capacity. If δ > 0 (which, of course, implies that ρ > 0), then learning is easier the larger is the current stock of knowledge possessed by the firm; i.e. increasing returns to knowledge accumulation prevails. In this situation, firms do not converge to a common size (or size distribution) in the long run. If, on the other hand, δ < 0 (i.e. ρ < 0), then diminishing returns prevail (and, indeed, knowledge will gradually depreciate over time). In t his case, we will observe reversion to the mean and convergence. When δ > 0 knowledge and, therefore, size differences between firms become magnified over time; when δ < 0, firms eventually converge in size. θ < 0 (or, equivalently, ψ < 0) indicates the existence of diminishing returns to growth, and may, therefore, reflect limitations on the ability of firms to absorb knowledge over time and/or to turn that knowledge into increased growth. If, on the other hand, θ > 0 (or, equivalently, ψ > 0), then firms will display sustained period of high (or low) growth.
in short
Using the basic framework, (2), we have outlined five empirical models of corporate growth based on five different learning mechanisms. These five can, in principle, be distinguished using a minimum of observable variables (we need only two): unsystematic learning (equation (4)) induces a random walk in firm size; learning by innovation (equations (6) or (7)) creates a correlation between current period growth rate of particular firms and the current and lagged innovations which they produce; learning by spillovers (equations (8) and (10)) create correlations between the growth of particular firms and either the innovations produced or the growth of their rivals; learning by doing (equation (12)) creates a correaltion between current period growth and cumulative output; and learning from internal resources (equation (15)) creates a correlation between the growth of a particular firm and it's size lagged and/or previous growth. Our null hypothesis is that learning is unsystematic; the other four models are all testable extensions of the null.
Growth Patterns in the US Automobile Industry
Our goal in what follows is to use these several different models of learning to try to identify the major sources of corporate growth for firms. Since it seems reasonable to believe that learning occurs in different ways in different sectors, we have drawn our sample of firms from a single industry -the US Automobile industry. Further, as learning is typically taken to lead to persistent performance differences between firms, we have collected as long a times series of data as possible to enable us to measure just how long persistent performance differences exist. Finally, as it seems plain that different environments (possibly including different stages of the industry life cycle) may lead to different types of learning or lead to different consequences of learning on corporate performance, we have tried to collect data across at least two apparently different competitive regimes for our sample: the pre-War period and the post-War period .
The Data
Our data covers the period 1910-1998 for the US automobile industry. The firms (and time periods) included in our sample are shown on Table I . Although quite a number of US and foreign owned firms have operated in this industry over the years, we limit our investigation to those for which enough times series data was available to make sensible computations (needless to say, they are also the ones with the most significant market shares). There are only two observables in the models outlined in Section 2: the output rate of each firm in each year and the number of innovations they produced in each year.
14 Figure I displays total industry output from 1910-1998, while Figure II shows the annual growth rate of total industry output over the period (omitting the War years). Figure III plots the total number of innovations produced in each year (up to 1981, when our innovation data ends). Two observations seem to be worth making about this data. First, it seems clear that there are two rather different periods which can be distinguished in the data: the pre-War and the postWar (1949-1998) periods. 15 Indeed, the (second) War generates a 'natural' break in the data, since car production in the US ceased for those several years. This division separates an earlier period in which the industry faced quite a lot of turbulence from changes in technology and demand from a later one where both tastes and technology were, arguably, more stable. The pre-War period saw the establishment of the industry, while the post-War period saw it rise to dominate the US economy and then mature. Growth rates in the early period were higher but much more erratic than they were in the later period, when growth was (relatively) steady and sustained. Data for foreign firms is only available for the post-War period since they produced only a minuscule fraction of total industry output (if that) before the War. 16 Second, innovative activity gradually declined over the whole history of the industry, although Figure III shows very little evidence of the sample break that seems so plain in Figures I and II. There is a (surprising but clear) negative correlation between innovative activity and market size in the data, a (not very surprising) positive correlation between mean market growth and innovative activity and a (surprising) negative correaltion between the variability of growth and innovative activity. Table II shows the mean and the standard deviation of the growth rates for all the domestic and foreign firms individually, and for all firms taken together. It also shows the p-values from the Shapiro-Wilks test for normality. As we saw on Figure II , the market as a whole grew more slowly after the War than before, but the interesting observation which springs out from Table II is that all of the individual firms in our sample (except Chrysler) experienced a higher average growth rates in the pre-War period than post-War. This relatively rapid post-War growth for individual firms in a market that was growing more slowly came at the expense of the many smaller firms who populated the market in the pre-War period and then exited after the War. The pre-War period is also characterised by a higher variance in growth rates for both those individual firms who operated in both periods, and for the market as a whole. Some of the foreign owned firms in our sample have average growth rates post-War that are similar to, or higher than, those recorded by the Big 3 firms in the pre-War period (Honda, Toyota Mitsubishi); VW and Mazda, however, had negative average growth rates. 18 The distribution of growth rates is, on the whole, normal (the exceptions are Packard, Studebaker, Honda and Toyota, and their departure from normality is not too egregious). Table III shows the correlations between the growth rates of different firms in three periods (the post-War period is divided into pre and post-1965 periods so that the growth of the foreign firms can be compared with those of the Big 3 more readily). What is interesting about these correlations is that, with the exception of those within the Big 3, they are rather small. Ford, GM and Chrysler all seem to expand and contract pretty much together, but other US and foreign firms displayed much more idiosyncratic patterns of growth. That is, correlations in the growth rates of most of the firms who operate in what is apparently the same market are rather low. This is rather surprising since one would normally expect firms in the same industry to be subject to much the same cost and demand shocks. One might argue that this is evidence that competition within the Big 3 is much higher than it is between members of the Big 3 and the rest or within the rest, or one might argue that they operate in different market segments or belong to different strategic groups within the broader automobile market. Table IV shows the correlations between current and recent past growth rates for each firm in the sampele. Although these correlations are slightly higher in the post-War period than in the pre-War period, the simple fact is that they are all very small (Honda and, to a lesser degree, Toyota and Nissan are exceptions to this observation). The obvious conclusion is that is that high (or, for that matter, low) growth rates simply do not persist for long over time; that is, that firms do not, on the whole, enjoy long periods of sustained success (or failure). This, of course, implies, that performance differences (as measured by growth rates) between firms are unlikely to persist for long either. This, in turn, suggests that size differences will persist; i.e. that firm sizes are not converging to a common size or distribution of sizes.
Regression Results
We now turn to the five different models of learning discussed in Section 2 . These are described in equations (6) and (7) ('learning by innovation'), (8) ('innovation spillovers'), (10) ('knowledge spillovers unrelated to specific innovations'), (12) ('learning by doing'), (15) ('internal resources') and, finally, (4) (the null hypothesis of 'unsystematic learning'). We estimated each equation for each firm first in the pre-War period and then in the post-War period . In each case, the independent variable is the growth rate of units produced by each firm or group of firms, measured as the first difference of the log of firm size. We examined each of the models independently, and then we explored fuller specifications combining several of the simple models into a more complete regression containing all or most of the relevant independent variables.
To test the (6) or (7), the learning by innovation hypothesis, we regressed the growth rate of units produced by each firm against the number of innovations that it produced lagged (with up to three lags). Regressions were not run for firms that produced no innovations (but we did regress the total innovations produced by all firms against aggregate industry growth rate). Since the innovation series ends in 1981, our post-War results contain only 36 years instead of 53. The results do not provide much, if any, support the view that the production of innovations is an important or systematic driver of growth rates. The signs on the co-efficients on innovations in most of the regressions were often negative on the first lag and positive on the second and third lags; the coefficients were positive more often in the pre-War period than in the post-War period, but they were rarely significant. R 2 's were low, and the usual F-tests suggested that it was almost never possible to reject the null of unsystematic learning against this alternative.
Equation (8) explores the effects of innovation spillovers on growth by regressing the growth of each firm on as the number of innovations produced by the rest of the industry (with up to three lags included) . These net industry innovation terms were almost always insignificant, and, it was never possible to reject the null against this alternative. Combining (7) and (8) --that is, including both own and rivals innovations up to three lags as possible determinants of growth rates -produced regressions whose explanatory power was still very weak: the R2's were low, and, in most cases, the usual F -tests suggested that all of the innovation variables could be excluded from the regressions. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that innovative activity --own or rivals -has not been a substantial or a systematic driver of corporate growth in this sector.
To explore the role of general knowledge spillovers as a source of growth --equation (10) --we regress the rate of growth of output for each firm on growth rate of total output (lagged once) of all other firms taken individually or collectively. Amongst the Big 3 firms, output related spillovers are significant only for Ford (in both the pre-War and post-War periods) and for Chrysler (only in the pre-War period). In both cases, the effect is negative, which is difficult to interpret as a learning effect (or, for that matter, as an agglomeration effect). The effect of output related spillovers is a significant driver of the growth of most of the other US firms only during the post-War period, but the estimated effect is also negative. On the other hand, output related spillovers are positive and significant determinants of the growth of most of the foreign firms (who are present only in the postWar period). All in all, however, these regressions do not provide much in the way of support for the view that output related spillovers power growth. For the most part, the usual F-tests fail to reject the null of unsystematic learning against this alternative, and the R2's are, once again, low. This is, of course, completely consistent with the weak correlations between the growth rates of different firms displayed on Table III. To test the learning by doing relationship (equation (12)), we regress the firm's growth rate of output on the log of it's cumulative output (lagged one period). Amongst the Big 3, learning by doing was a significant driver of growth rates only for Ford, for which it was positive and very strong in the pre-war period. Learning by doing also had a significant effect on the growth of almost all of the small domestic and foreign owned firms in the post-War period, but with a negative (it was insignificant for VW, Mazda and Mitsubishi). This is, of course, very hard to interpret. However, it is impossible to reject the null of unsystematic learning against this particular alternative. Again, this is not a surprise: if learning by doing powered growth, we would see persistently higher growth rates for the largest, longest established firms than for newer, younger entrants, and this we do not see.
Thus, we have found very little substantive or systematic evidence to suggest that that the production of innovations, spillovers or learning by doing are important sources of growth for firms in this industry. This leaves us with the notion 'learning through internal resources' --equation (15) --, and the null hypothesis that learning is unsystematic -equation (4).
The argument that absorptive capacity conditions learning builds on the observation that firms who accumulate a significant body of knowledge will be better learners, and hence will be able to accumulate knowledge more rapidly or thoroughly in the future. One implication of this is that learning is liable to be path-dependent because prior knowledge permits the assimilation and exploitation of new knowledge. A second, related implication is that success today creates the conditions for success tomorrow. The result is that growth rates will be auto-correlated over time. One easy way to examine the hypothesis of learning by absorptive capacity is to regress firm growth rates on previous growth rates. However, as we saw on Table IV , growth rates are not highly auto-correlated, and this is confirmed by simple regressions of current on lagged growth rates. The effect of prior growth rates on current growth rate is usually much larger in the post-War period than in the pre-War period, and, in fact, none of the pre-War coefficients are significant and most of the post-War ones are not either.
Equation (15) is a bit more general than this: it leads one to a regression of current growth on lagged size and lagged growth. Table V shows the estimates that we obtained from this regression. In general, the estimates suggest that ϕ = 0, but that ρ < 0; i.e. that lagged size is typically negatively associated with growth, but that lagged growth rates are, in general, not. This is not consistent with the view that there are increasing returns to knowledge accumulation (actually, it suggests that knowledge depreciates) or that there are increasing returns to growth. In fact, the F statistics shown on Table V indicate that for most of the firms it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that all of the coefficients in all of the regressions shown on the Table are jointly zero.
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All of this leaves one with precious little evidence upon which to build a case for rejecting the null hypothesis that learning is unsystematic and opportunistic. It is possible to find traces of some systematic drivers of growth, particularly in the long boom of the post-War market, but these are weak and hard to measure with any accuracy.
Conclusion
If learning is an important source of competitive advantage, then firms who accumulate skills and knowledge appropriate to their environment will outperform those who do not. More interesting and possibly more useful is a second insight, namely that the way that firms learn ought to be visible in how they perform. In this paper, we have used this second insight to pursue the empirical implications of five different methods of learning on corporate growth performance in the US automobile industry in the pre and post-War periods. The bottom line is this: although one can detect traces of most of the different learning mechanisms in the data, it is hard to find any systematic evidence which supports any hypothesis other than that which asserts that learning is unsystematic and random.
We wish to close with three observations on both the work that we have done, and the conclusions which we have drawn from it. The first is methodological. There is a large and very interesting literature on corporate learning, one which shows no signs of diminishing in intensity. Unfortunately, it also shows few signs of accepting the kinds of empirical discipline which it is likely to need if it is to produce hard edge propositions about market evolution, or normative frameworks for managers. Learning -and the associated concept of a stock of knowledge -are, by their very nature, unobservable, and that means this it is possible develop all kinds of propositions about their causes or consequences which cannot, in general, be verified or falsified. This, of course, makes the subject an open field for anyone with a theory to propound or an axe to grind, a state of affairs that cannot be good for the subject in the long run. In this paper, we have tried to show that it is possible to develop relatively simple empirical models which do not require many observables but still enables one to make useful inferences about some of the possible sources of learning. It is extremely unlikely that the work that we have reported here will be the last word on the subject, and, indeed, we would be desperately disappointed if it were.
Our second concluding observation is also methodological. Much of what we have said here differs from the conventional wisdom about corporate performance because of the particular performance measure that we have been looking at. As is well known, data on accounting profitability are highly auto-correlated over time, and suggest that it is possible for firms to be persistently successful for many successive years. Further, the data shows that performance differences between firms persist for long periods of time. Accounting profits are, however, not the only measure of firm performance that one might legitimately examine, and measures like sales growth, productivity growth and (slightly less clearly) shareholder rates of return are much more variable over time and across firms. It is not clear whether there is one single best way to measure firm performance, but it does seem clear that relying only on the properties of accounting profitability to make inferences about performance patterns is liable to be highly misleading.Our third and final conclusion is that our conclusions about learning in the US Automobile industry are, in a sense, not all that surprising. There is a long and rich literature which suggests that the growth rates recorded by many firms in many sectors are, roughly speaking, random, and that is basically what we have observed. The various models that we have set out in this paper have enabled us to interpret this result in terms of different learning processes, but it is, of course, possible to think about it in other ways. 20 One way or the other, the interesting observation is future growth performance is very hard to predict from current or recent past performance, or, for that matter, from average industry growth performance. The implications of this observation for how we think about corporate performance is, we think, profound, and go well beyond the US Automobile industry. It is commonplace to think that firms differ from each other, but these empirical results say something much stronger than this: not only are performance differences are not constant over time, but they vary in unpredictable ways over time. The common practice of accounting for differences performance between firms by invoking an unobservable asset (like the stock of knowledge or some set of core capabilities) is fine, but these results suggest that one cannot suppose that these invisible assets are durable (or that their effects on performance are systematic and stable), or that it will be easy to predict how well today's assets will fare tomorrow. Nothing in this life is permanent, and this seems to apply particularly clearly in the case of the sources of corporate growth. GM 1910 -1998 Ford 1910 -1998 Chrysler 1925 -1998 Other US owned firms:
Packard * 1910 -1941 American 1946 -1985 Studebaker 1946 -1966 Foreign owned firms:
VW 1965 -1998 Honda 1971 -1998 Nissan 1965 -1998 Toyota 1996 -1998 Mazda 1985 -1998 Mitsubishi 1985 -1998 * There is no output data for Packard for the period 1926 -1934 --***=significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 10% level.
--Pre = pre-War, Pst = post-War.
--Units refer to the level of output (number of automobiles produced) in logs. Growth refers to the growth rate of output.
--The F statistic is the Prob>F. 
